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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
and Appellee ] 
vs. ] 
TROY N. PASSEY, J 
Defendant, ] 
and Appellant 
i BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
i Case No. 920267-CA 
\ Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to § 78-
2a-3(2)(d) Utah Code Ann. (1992 Supp.). See, State v. Humphrey, 
823 P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether blood tests results made from a 
acquired subsequent to an invalid arrest are 
appellant voluntarily consented to the blood 
appellant's consent was acquired independent 
arrest. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. "Because of the trial court's advantageous position in 
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress, that 
determination should not be reversed unless it is clearly 
erroneous." State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citing State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). Thus, 
unless the trial court's ruling was clearly in error, the court's 
blood sample 
admissible where the 
sample and where the 
of the invalid 
decision to grant or deny the motion should be upheld. State v. 
Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 256 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee stipulates to the appellants statement of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about October 27, 1991, the Appellant, Troy N. Passey, 
was traveling southbound on SR-215, south of 4400, when his truck 
left the road and lodged in a culvert on the westside of the 
roadway. (Tr. p. 6) 
2. Shortly after the accident, Officer David Popelmayer of the 
Utah Highway Patrol arrived on the scene of the accident. He 
observed the appellant's car in the culvert, and damage to a 
fence and sign that was caused by the car's path. (Tr. p. 7). 
3. Upon the arrival of Officer Popelmayer, the defendant was 
being placed in ambulance. As the defendant was being placed in 
the ambulance, his identification was secured and he was 
identified as the named appellant. (Tr. p. 10). 
4. Once the defendant was in the ambulance, Officer Popelmayer 
approached the back of the ambulance. While standing at the back 
of the ambulance and at the feet of the appellant, Officer 
Popelmayer could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage. (Tr. p. 
11). 
5. Based on the odor of alcohol, discussions concerning the 
accident from witnesses, and evidence from the accident scene, 
2 
Officer Popelmayer radioed Officer Hogan and requested 
that he meet the appellant at the hospital and place him under 
arrest for driving under the influence and witness the blood 
draw. (Tr. p. 12). 
6. Upon arrival at LDS hospital, Officer Hogan located the 
appellant, placed him under arrest, read him the admonition 
concerning the consequences for refusing the comply with blood 
sample and then waited with the appellant for the blood 
technician to arrive to take the blood sample. (Tr. p. 18). 
7. After the blood technician arrived, Officer Hogan asked the 
appellant for his consent to take a blood sample. The appellant 
consented and a sample was taken. Officer Hogan witnessed the 
blood draw and then read the appellant his Miranda rights. (Tr. 
p. 23). 
8. On February 12, 1992, a suppression hearing was held. The 
hearing considered two motions submitted by the appellant. The 
first motion sought to suppress the blood test results based on a 
lack of probable cause to arrest and the second motion was a 
motion to dismiss. (Appellant's appendix 2). 
9. After hearing the arguments of counsel and considering the 
authorities submitted, the court ruled that although there was 
insufficient probable cause to arrest the appellant, because the 
appellant voluntarily consented to the blood sample the blood 
tests results were admissible. (Tr. pp. 38-39). 
10. Based on its findings, the court denied the appellant's 
motions. (Tr. pp. 40-47). 
3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Evidence acquired subsequent to an invalid arrest is 
admissible where the State can establish that the evidence was 
seized pursuant to a voluntary consent and that the consent was 
obtained independent of the invalid arrest. In this case, 
although the appellant's arrest was found to be invalid for a 
lack of probable cause, because the appellant voluntarily 
consented to the blood sample and the consent was obtained 
independent of the arrest, the blood tests results are 
admissible. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the 
appellant's motions to suppress the results and dismiss the case 
was not in error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE 
BLOOD SAMPLE AND THE CONSENT WAS ACQUIRED INDEPENDENT 
OF THE INVALID ARREST, THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS ARE 
ADMISSIBLE. 
The appellant contends that because the arrest was invalid, 
the blood test results should have been suppressed and the case 
dismissed. However, evidence acquired subsequent to invalid 
arrest is nevertheless admissible where the State can prove that 
the evidence was acquired by voluntary consent and that the 
consent was obtained independent of the invalid arrest. State v. 
Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688-690 (Utah 1990). 
Whether the consent was voluntarily depends on the "totality 
of all the surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics 
of the accused and the details of the interrogation." State v. 
4 
Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989)(citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte. 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973)). Here# the trial court found 
that the appellant's consent was voluntary because it was given 
in the neutral environment of a hospital as opposed to a police 
station, and because no threats accompanied the request for the 
appellant's consent. (Tr. p. 39). Thus, because the trial court 
considered the surrounding circumstances under which the 
appellant's consent was made, the court's finding that the 
consent was voluntary is not clearly erroneous. 
Likewise, the appellant's consent was acquired independent 
of the invalid arrest. The test used to determine whether the 
evidence was acquired independent of the prior illegality is 
whether the acquisition of the evidence was "sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 690; (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 
S.Ct. 407, L.Ed. 441 (1963)). In this case, the appellant was 
already secured as a result of the injuries he suffered from the 
accident when his consent to the blood sample was requested. In 
other words, the appellant's arrest was not a pretext to the 
request for his consent. This was noted by the court in its 
findings that the appellant was not "going anywhere" when his 
consent was requested. (Tr. p. 39). Thus, the request for the 
appellant's consent to take a blood sample was independent from 
in the invalid seizure. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
Because the appellant voluntarily consented to the blood 
sample and the consent was not acquired through the exploitation 
of the invalid arrest, the blood tests results are admissible 
despite the fact that the arrest was invalid for a lack of 
probable cause. Accordingly, because the blood test results are 
admissible the trial court's denial of the appellant's motions to 
suppress the blood test results and to dismiss case was not 
clearly erroneous. For these reasons, this Court should affirm 
the decision of the Third Circuit Court in denying the 
defendant's motions. 
__ / October 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this>*^^6^ay of Auguoto, 1992. 
A>>XREENLIEF 
Attorney for/Plaintiff/Appellee 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
MAILED/DELIVfiRElT"a copy of the foregoing to Larry Long, 
attorney for appellant, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 200, Salt Lake 
->-> J October 
City, Utah 84111-2705, this>s£^£-day of ficpteabeif, 1992. 
7 
220 Utah 779 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
In Emery v. Emery* the California Su-
preme Court concluded that as between 
California domiciliaries involved in an auto-
mobile accident in Idaho, the law of their 
domicile should govern. The court's ratio-
nale was as follows: 
We think that disabilities to sue and im-
munities from suit because of a family 
relationship are more properly deter-
mined by reference to the law of the 
state of the famfly domicile. That state 
has the primary responsibility for estab-
lishing and regulating the incidents of 
the family relationship and it is the only 
state in which the parties can, by partic-
ipation in the legislative processes, effect 
a change in those incidents. Moreover, it 
is undesirable that the rights, duties, dis-
abilities, and immunities conferred or im-
posed by the family relationship should 
constantly change as members of the 
family cross state boundaries during 
temporary absences from their home.6 
In Schwartz v. Schwartz,1 a case identi-
cal on its facts, a husband and wife, both 
domiciliaries of New York, experienced an 
automobile accident in Arizona. The wife 
sued her husband in Arizona, Interspousal 
tort suits were not permitted in Arizona, 
but they were permitted in New York. 
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the 
law of the domicile had application and 
quoted with approval from Clark v. Clark8 
as follows: 
"[The] old rule is today almost complete-
ly discredited as an unvarying guide to 
choice of law decision in all tort 
cases No conflict of laws authority 
in America today agrees that the old rule 
should be retained No American 
court which has felt free to re-examine 
the matter thoroughly in the last decade 
has chosen to retain the old rule.. ~ It 
is true that some courts, even in recent 
decisions, have retained^ But their 
failure to reject it has resulted from an 
5. 45 CaUd 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955). 
6. Id. at 428, 289 P.2d at 223. 
7. 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968). 
8. 107 N.H. 351. 222 A.2d 205 (1966). 
9. 103 Ariz, at 563, 447 P.2d at 255. 
unwillingness to abandon established 
precedent . . . not to any belief that the 
old rule was a good one. [107 N.H. at 
352,] 222 A.2d at 207 [citations omit-
ted]/' 9 
[1] We are persuaded by the rationale 
of the Restatement rule, infra, and the 
numerous jurisdictions which follow it We 
therefore adopt the rule in Utah and re-
verse and remand with instructions to ap-
ply the law of the domicile on the issue of 
interspousal immunity. 
II 
[2] The remaining issue is whether 
plaintiffs action is barred for failure to 
give timely notice of claim. We conclude 
from the record before us that a genuine 
issue of material fact remains to be re-
solved, namely, whether the State is es-
topped to assert the lack of timely notice of 
claim.10 This is to be seen in that the trial 
court specifically found that "there was 
unrefuted testimony by affidavit that the 
State of Utah denied through the Division 
of Personnel Management that Defendant 
Flinders was an employee of the State of 
Utah." Hence, on remand, plaintiff should 
be allowed to present evidence of her claim 
of estoppel.11 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
STEWART, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
(concurring and dissenting): 
I concur in part I but dissent from part 
II of the majority opinion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1986, Supp. 
1988) requires that as a prerequisite to 
suing a state employee for an act or omis-
sion occurring within the scope of his em-
10. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure precludes summary judgment in the face 
of a genuine issue as to any material fact 
11. See Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 
2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). 
STATE v, 
Cite a* 779 P.2d 
ployment, the plaintiff must, within one 
year after the claim arises, file a notice of 
claim with the attorney general and with 
the agency employing the employee. No 
attempt to comply with that statute was 
made here by plaintiff. She seeks to ex-
cuse herself from that requirement based 
on the affidavit of an investigator she hired 
who stated that seven months after the 
accident, he called the Division of Person-
nel Management of the State of Utah re-
questing confirmation of the state's em-
ployment of Ronald G. Flinders. He fur-
ther stated that he was advised that no 
individual with that name was employed by 
the state according to its records. He ap-
parently did not ask if there was such an 
employee with that name at the time of the 
accident 
That denial of employment, however, is 
entirely insufficient to support an estoppel 
against the state and excuse plaintiff from 
complying with the statute. This is be-
cause she had in her possession the acci-
dent report filed by the investigating police 
officer that defendant Flinders was driving 
a state-owned vehicle and that he was em-
ployed by a state agency whose address 
was 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84119. She made no attempt to file a 
claim with any state agency at that address 
although there is a state office building 
there housing at least two state agencies, 
one of which is the Department of Public 
Safety, which was and is Flinders' employ-
er. There is in the record an affidavit of 
an assistant in the personnel division of the 
Department of Public Safety stating that 
on the date of the accident, and at all times 
thereafter, Flinders' name was on the list 
of employees of that department, that any 
person could have contacted that depart-
ment and received verification of Flinders' 
employment there, and that at all times 
since the date of the accident the Departs 
ment of Public Safety has been housed in a 
building at 4501 South 2700 West, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84119. In granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of Flinders, the 
trial court expressly found that 
[h]ad Plaintiff contacted the Personnel 
Division of the Department of Public 
Safety, she would have received verifica-
STRAIN Utah 221 
221 (Utah 1989) 
tion of Defendant Flinders' employment 
status with that agency. 
Not only did plaintiff fail to file a claim 
with the Department of Public Safety, she 
made no attempt whatever to file the claim 
with the attorney general. No excuse is 
offered for that omission except that plain-
tiff was not sure whether Flinders was a 
state employee. That is entirely insuffi-
cient as an excuse. 
Since plaintiff always had all the infor-
mation needed to file a timely claim with 
the Department of Public Safety andTwith 
the attorney general, I cannot escape the 
conclusion that as a matter of law, her 
failure to do so was not the fault of Flin-
ders or the Department which will work an 
estoppel against them. Plaintiffs failure 
stems solely from her own unwillingness to 
make any effort to file based on informa-
tion which she already possessed and which 
was always accurate. When she chose not 
to file, she assumed the risk of ignoring 
information in her possession. 
fO !KIY HUMIIIJY5TIM> 
I f / * * ' ' * * * ** 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Charles N. STRAIN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860531. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 5, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted by jury in the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., of second-degree mur-
der, a first-degree felony, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, Associate CJ., 
held: (1) detective's Miranda warning that 
defendant had right to have attorney ap-
pointed for him by court "at later date" 
was not defective; (2) defendant knowingly 
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and voluntarily waived his rights to remain 
silent and to counsel before and during 
interrogation; and (3) detective's threat of 
first-degree murder charge against him 
and possible execution if convicted and 
"guarantee" that defendant would be 
charged only with second-degree murder if 
he admitted his involvement was improper, 
and remand was warranted for determina-
tion of voluntariness of defendant's confes-
sion under totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances. 
Case remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred and filed 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>412.2(3) 
Detective's Miranda warning was not 
defective because it informed suspect that 
he had right to have attorney appointed for 
him by court "at a later date"; warning did 
not imply that attorney would not be avail-
able for him at initial interview, and sus-
pect had no Miranda right to immediate 
appointment of counsel or warning to that 
effect 
2. Criminal Law <*=>412.2(5) 
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his rights to remain silent and to 
counsel before and during interrogation, 
without any intimidation, coercion or decep-
tion on part of detective in that regard; 
detective issued fresh warning before each 
interrogation, and defendant's responses 
thereto indicated his wish to speak. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
3. Criminal Law «=>520(2), 522(1) 
Detective's threat of first-degree mur-
der charge against defendant and possible 
execution if convicted of homicide of his 
step-daughter and his "guarantee"—wj?ich 
could have been construed as offer of 
promise of leniency—that defendant would 
be charged with second-degree murder if 
he admitted his involvement was improper, 
and remand was warranted for evidentiary 
hearing to determine voluntariness of de-
fendant's confession under totality of all 
the surrounding circumstances; while coer-
cive threats and promises were made to 
defendant, he also gave indications that 
officers' improper statements did not in-
duce him to confess. U.C.A. 1953, 76-5-
203. 
Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for defendant 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson and David B. Thomp-
son, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lee. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendant Charles Nicholas Strain ap-
peals his jury conviction of second degree 
murder, a first degree felony. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978, Supp.1988). 
Defendant was arrested on February 20, 
1986, in Scottsdale, Arizona, on a fugitive 
warrant issued in the state of Idaho. Upon 
arrest, Arizona detective Thomas Hill alleg-
edly advised him of* his Miranda rights. 
Four hours later, Detective Peter Bell of 
the Utah County, Utah, Sheriffs office 
questioned him about the shooting death of 
defendant's sixteen-year-olcT stepdaughter, 
Deanna, whose decomposed body had been 
found some five years earlier in Spanish 
Fork Canyon, Utah. Throughout this ini-
tial three-hour interview, defendant main-
tained his innocence with respect to that 
death. The following morning, Detective 
Bell resumed his questioning. This session 
was followed by another interrogation that 
evening by Detective Bell and also by Utah 
County Deputy Sheriff Scott Carter. The 
interrogation culminated in defendant's 
signing a statement, admitting the killing. 
He was subsequently charged with second 
degree murder. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress his confession. The motion cited 
inadequacies in the Miranda warning, as 
well as threats and promises made to him 
by Detective Bell which allegedly rendered 
his confession involuntary. This motion 
was granted by the trial court in view of 
inadequacies which it found in the Mi-
randa warning given by Detective Bell. 
Subsequently, further evidence concerning 
defendant's arrest was discovered which 
prompted the trial court to reopen the hear-
STATE v. 
Cite as 779 PJUi 
ing wherein Arizona Detective Hill testified 
that he did recite the Miranda warning to 
defendant upon his arrest on the Idaho 
charges. In response, the trial court vacat-
ed its order suppressing defendant's state-
ments. At trial, defendant again objected 
to the admission of his confession into evi-
dence on the grounds that the Miranda 
warning given by Detective Hill was inade-
quate and that the confession was coerced. 
The trial court overruled both objections 
and admitted the confession. In so doing, 
the court did not specifically address the 
voluntariness challenge which focused on 
the threats and promises made to defen-
dant Defendant was found guilty of sec-
ond degree murder and sentenced to a pris-
on term of five years to life. 
• I . -
[1] Defendant maintains that the trial 
court erred in failing to suppress his con-
fession because the Miranda warning by 
Detective Hill was defective. The Mi-
randa warning originated out of the land-
mark United States Supreme Court case of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct 
1602, 16 LEd.2d 694 (1966). That case 
outlined those basic rights of which the 
accused must be adequately informed be-
fore any of his statements made to law 
enforcement officers may be used as evi-
dence against him. 
He must be warned prior to any ques-
tioning that he has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says can be used 
against him in a court of law, that he has 
the right to the presence of an attorney, 
and that if he cannot afford an attorney 
one will be appointed for him prior to any 
questioning if he so desires. Opportuni-
ty to exercise these rights must be af-
forded to him throughout the interroga-
tion. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct at 1630, 
16L.Ed.2dat726. 
While Miranda is recognized as obligat-
ing police to follow certain procedures in 
their dealings with an accused, the decision 
did not prescribe that law enforcement offi-
cers adhere to a verbatim recitation of the 
words of the opinion. Miranda, however, 
did hold that "in the absence of a fully 
. STRAIN Utah 223 
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effective equivalent," statements made by 
a defendant could not be used as evidence 
against him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 
S.Ct. at 1629,16 L.Ed.2d at 725. Since Mir-
anda, the United States Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed its intention of not extending the 
"rigidity" of that case to "the precise for-
mulation of the warnings given a criminal 
defendant" California v. Prysock, 453 
U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct 2806, 2807, 2809, 69 
L.Ed.2d 696, 701 (1981) (per curiam). With 
this in mind, we examine the Miranda 
warning given to defendant upon his arrest 
Detective Hill testified at the reopened 
pretrial hearing on defendant's motion for 
suppression of his confession that he gave 
defendant the following Miranda warning: 
I said you have the right to remain silent, 
anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law. You have 
the right to the presence of an attorney 
to assist you prior to questioning to be 
with you during questioning if you so 
desire. If you cannot afford an attorney, 
you have the right to have an attorney 
appointed for you by the court at a later 
date. Do you understand these rights? 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendant argues that this warning im-
plied that an attorney would not be avail-
able for him at the initial interview. He 
asserts that a Miranda warning must in-
form the accused that an attorney will be 
available immediately at the time of any 
interrogation. These conclusions are un-
warranted. While the warning did inform 
defendant about the immediate unavailabil-
ity of court-appointed counsel for him, we 
do not believe it carried any implication 
that he was required to submit to an inter-
view with law enforcement officers without 
the presence of appointed counsel if he 
could not afford one. Furthermore, Mi-
randa does not suggest that a suspect 
must be told he has the right to the imme-
diate appointment of counsel: 
If the individual cannot obtain an attor-
ney and he indicates that he wants one 
before speaking to police, they must re-
spect his decision to remain silent 
This does not mean, as some have sug-
gested, that each police station must 
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have a "station house lawyer" present at 
all times to advise prisoners. It does 
mean, however, that if police propose to 
interrogate a person they must make 
known to him that he is entitled to a 
lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, 
a lawyer will be provided for him prior to 
any interrogation. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct at 1628, 
16 L.Ed.2d at 724; see also Poyner v. Com-
monwealth, 229 Va. 401, 409-10, 329 S.E.2d 
815, 822-23, cert denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 
S.Ct. 189, 88 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). 
Detective Hill's warning did not violate 
these principles. Defendant was informed 
of his right to counsel before and during 
any police interrogation. He was also in-
formed of his right to remain silent But 
the immediate right to counsel which defen-
dant envisions is not within the scope of 
the Miranda decision. Once the accused 
requests court-appointed counsel, it is 
treated as a wish to remain silent, and the 
police cannot proceed to interrogate him 
until such counsel has been obtained or 
until defendant initiates the interview. 
One additional point is helpful. In Cali-
fornia v. Prysock, instances were exam-
ined where courts have held particular Mi-
randa warnings inadequate in advising the 
accused of his right to court-appointed 
counsel. It concluded that Miranda warn-
ings which "linked" the right of appointed 
counsel to some future point in time after 
the police interrogation violated Miranda 
principles. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360, 101 
S.Ct at 2810. In some of these cases, the 
right to appointed counsel had been linked 
solely to appearances before the court, to 
the time when charges were to be filed, or 
to the time when the accused was transfer-
red to another state. United States v. 
Garcia, 431 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.1970) (per 
curiam); People v. Bolinski, 260 Cal. 
App.2d 705, 67 Cal.Rptr. 347 (1968);^see 
also United States ex r*L Williams v. 
Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.1972). 
It is clear that Detective Hill's Miranda 
warning did not link defendant's right to 
counsel to any future point in time after 
police interrogation. The warning given by 
Detective Hill was the fully functional 
equivalent required by Miranda. There-
fore, we hold that statements of defendant 
are not inadmissible due to a violation of 
Miranda. 
II. 
[2] Defendant next contends that he did 
not knowingly and voluntarily waive his 
privilege to remain silent and to have coun-
sel before and during the interrogation. 
Miranda warnings were intended to guard 
against the inherently coercive nature of a 
custodial police interrogation by fully in-
forming the suspect of the state's intention 
to use any self-incriminating statements to 
secure his conviction. Moran v. Burbine, 
475 U.S. 412, 420, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140, 89 
L.Ed.2d 410, 420 (1986). Once the accused 
has been so advised, lie has the privilege of 
waiving these rights but must do so volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Mi-
randa, 384 U.S. at 444, 475, 86 S.Ct at 
1612, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707, 724. This is 
generally acknowledged as meaning that 
the waiver must have been the product of a 
"free and deliberate choice rather than in-
timidation, coercion or deception" and exe-
cuted with "full awareness-both of the na-
ture of the right being abandoned and [of] 
the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it" Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct at 
1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421. Furthermore, this 
determination requires an examination of 
the "totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation." Fare v. Michael C, 
442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct 2560, 2572, 61 
L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979). 
The record not only discloses defendant's 
full awareness of the consequences of his 
waiver but also the lack of intimidation, 
coercion, or deception on the part of Detec-
. tive Bell in this regard. The following 
portions of the interrogation demonstrate 
this: 
[Interview on the morning of February 
27, 1986.] 
Bell: Kind of like the rights, like I gave 
you last night, you know you don't have 
to, you don't have to say anything if you 
want to. 
Strain: Well, I understand that That's 
not any problem. I just didn't know the 
necessity of it 
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Bell: Um hum. Kind of still holds true 
today, you know, when we're talking to-
day the same thing goes as last night, 
you don't have to talk if you don't want 
to. 
Strain: I've always known that But 
sometimes all I do is make it worse and I 
found that out a long time ago, when you 
don't tell them what they want then they 
think the worst and thaf s when you're 
convicted of something you don't know 
nothing about It happened to me twice 
before. 
[Interview on the evening of February 
27, 1986.] • 
Bell: (T]he number one thing I want to 
make sure again is that you are very 
well aware of your rights. You are go-
ing to hear them over and over again—I 
told you last night and I told you this 
morning. 
Strain: That ain't going to make any 
difference. 
Bell: But you do have the right to re-
main silent 
Strain: Hum um. 
Bell: You don't have to answer any of 
our questions if you don't want to. 
Strain: I know this. 
Bell: If you feel you need your attorney 
present, the State of Arizona I'm sure 
will be glad to appoint one for you. 
Strain: Ya, but that would just tie you 
up longer. 
It is clear that defendant did voluntarily 
and knowingly waive his right to remain 
silent and his right to counsel before and 
during the interrogation. The trial court 
did not err in this respect by refusing to 
suppress defendant's inculpatory state-
ments. 
III. 
[3] Defendant next contends that the 
trial court erred by failing to suppress his 
confession because it was obtained through 
coercion by Detective Bell. Such a claim, if 
valid, would render the confession involun-
tary as being violative of defendant's fifth 
and fourteenth amendment rights against 
self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
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U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct 1489,12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). 
Specifically, defendant contends that De-
tective Bell threatened a first degree mur-
der charge against him and possible execu-
tion, if convicted of that charge, if he did 
not admit his involvement in the homicide 
of his step-daughter. Set alongside this 
threat was an alleged promise by Bell 
which offered defendant the lesser charge 
of second degree murder if he admitted 
involvement in the murder. Detective Bell 
denied making such a promise to defen-
dant 
Over the years, both federal and^  state 
courts have struggled with the concept of 
voluntariness and have employed several 
formulations in their attempts to apply it 
Several courts have stated that a confes-
sion of the accused must be the product or 
result of a "free and unconstrained choice." 
Other courts have defined the concept of 
voluntariness by insisting that the confes-
sion be "freely self-determined," or the 
product of "rational intellect and free will" 
Another perspective frames the issue as 
"whether the defendant's will was over-
borne at the time he confessed." See Unit-
ed States v. Gordon, 638 F.Supp. 1120, 
1144 (W.D. La.1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 
908, 107 S.Ct 2488, 96 L.Ed.2d 380 (1987) 
(citations omitted). As required in an ex-
amination of a waiver of Miranda rights, 
the determination of voluntariness of con-
fessions requires the court to consider "the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstanc-
es—both the characteristics of the accused 
and the details of the interrogation." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
226, 93 S.Ct 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 
862 (1973); State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 
1348 (Utah 1986); State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 
233 (Utah 1985). The mere representation 
to a defendant by officers that they will 
make known to the prosecutor and to the 
court that he cooperated with them, United 
States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 
1985), or appeals to the defendant that full 
cooperation would be his best course of 
action, United States v. Pomares, 499 F.2d 
1220, 1222 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 
1032, 95 S.Ct 514, 42 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974), 
have been recognized as not coercive. 
However, as the State freely admits in the 
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instant case, most courts have found a 
confession involuntary where a threat to 
pursue a higher charge if the accused did 
not confess, or a promise to pursue a lesser 
charge if he did confess, was exhortative. 
United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 
1335-37 (9th Cir.1981); State v. Rhiner, 
352 N.W.2d 258, 262-63 (Iowa 1984). 
The record indicates that during the 
course of the February 27, 1986 morning 
interrogation, Detective Bsll made the fol-
lowing statement to defendant* 
Now, what I'm trying to tell you right 
now Charlie is, all you have to do, all 
you've got to do . . . the only thing that 
is keeping you from going back to the 
State of Utah and looking at a possible 
execution on a first degree murder 
charge or a second degree murder 
charge, which is some jail time. The 
only thing that keeps between them two, 
is "yes, I did or no I didn't" Yes, second 
degree murder, no, I didn't, f will prove 
that you did and you are looking at a 
possible execution date in the State of 
Utah. That's all I want to hear from you 
Charlie, all I want to hear is yes or no. 
All I want to hear is, is there going to be 
first degree murder or second degree 
murder. I don't want to hear, "No I 
didn't have nothing to do with it," be-
cause I can prove it and I'm going to 
prove it I'll go back to the State of 
Utah today, the County Attorney is go-
ing to file 
Later, Detective Bell repeated this line of 
interrogation. 
Utah is, and Utah is going to bring you 
back down. Charlie we're going to try 
you for murder. So, just tell me right 
now, lef s just (not understandable), yes 
for jail time or no, are we going to go to 
trial and for possible execution. That's 
all I want to hear from you is just yes or 
no. - ^ 
Defendant immediately ^sked, "Just that 
simple?" Upon this response, Detective 
Bell then framed his dichotomous proposal 
into what easily would have been taken as 
an offer of a promise of leniency: 
Just that simple. And I can guarantee 
it Charlie, I can guarantee its that 
simple. My God, this thing has been 
drug on for five years. The little girl's 
body up in the canyon, the soul was 
crying for justice. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Not only did Detective Bell threaten a 
first degree murder charge and possible 
execution if convicted, we believe that he 
also crossed the line when he offered de-
fendant a promise as evidenced by his per-
sonal guarantee. The detective's offer was 
framed strictly in terms which offered de-
fendant a second degree murder charge 
and jail time for his "yes, I did." Adding 
to his proposal the dimension of leniency, 
Bell informed defendant of the potential 
first degree murder charge against him 
and possible execution upon conviction if he 
refused his guaranteed offer. 
Upon Bell's extension of this promise of 
leniency, defendant attempted to relate his 
philosophy of life but was interrupted by 
Detective Bell: "I don't want to hear it 
Charlie. All I want to hear is yes or no." 
After a few sympathetic comments by De-
tective Bell concerning defendant's hard 
life, Bell continued to press: 
Well, you are [trying to snow the law 
enforcement] by not telling me yes or no, 
because I know, Charlie, I know. Okay, 
I'm just going to tell you right out flat, I 
know. And all I have to do is prove it to 
twelve jurors in the State of Utah. All 
you have to do is just make an affirma-
tive that, yes, you know too, or no, you 
don't know and we'll have a trial. That's 
all I'm asking for. 
Soon after this statement, Detective Bell 
offered defendant a moment to think. 
Then after one final push by Bell, defen-
dant began to admit his involvement in the 
murder which eventually resulted in a 
signed statement that evening admitting 
culpability for the killing. 
It is clear that the statements made by 
Detective Bell to defendant were impermis-
sibly coercive because they carried a threat 
of greater punishment or a promise for 
lesser punishment depending on whether 
he confessed. The State, however, urges 
us to affirm the admission of the confes-
sion because looking at the "totality of all 
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the surrounding circumstances," the im-
proper statements of Detective Bell did not 
induce defendant to confess. The State 
points out that defendant was an adult in 
his forties and familiar with the criminal 
"justice system. Certain statements made 
by defendant in the course of the interroga-
tion indicated that he little cared whether 
he lived or died. He stated that he had "no 
life left"; that he did not care if he were 
executed; and that he cared only about the 
persons he would leave behind. 
While in Bram v. United States, 168 
U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), 
the statement was made that any threat or 
promise, however slight, renders a confes-
sion involuntary and inadmissible, later 
cases do not repeat that rigid rule but 
follow the totality of all the circumstances 
test In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 90 S.Ct 1463, 25 LEd.2d 747 (1970), 
the Court found that a guilty plea made by 
an accused was not rendered invo/untary 
by the sole fact that the statute under 
which he was charged permitted imposition 
of the death sentence only upon a jury's 
recommendation and thereby made the risk 
of death the price of a jury trial. This 
death penalty provision had earlier been 
held to be unconstitutional in United 
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct 
1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968), because it im-
posed an impermissible burden upon the 
exercise of a constitutional right Notwith-
standing the coercive effect of the statute 
in effect at the time the defendant in Bra-
dy entered his guilty plea, the Court, in a 
later proceeding brought by Brady to set 
aside his guilty plea, looked at all of the 
relevant circumstances surrounding the en-
try of the plea and found that there were 
other valid considerations which prompted 
its making, viz., a co-defendant had given a 
confession, decided to plead guilty, and be-
came available to testify against Brady. 
See also People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 
365 N.W.2d 648 (1984), where the Supreme 
Court of Michigan rejected the strict per se 
test sometimes attributed to Bram v. Unit-
ed States, and adopted "the simple rule 
that a confession caused by a promise of 
leniency is involuntary and inadmissible." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In the instant case, the trial court did not 
address defendant's contention that even 
though an adequate Miranda warning had 
been given to him, his subsequent confes-
sion was the result of coercive threats and 
promises made by the interrogating offi-
cers. We therefore do not have before us 
an adequate record upon which we can 
determine the question of voluntariness. 
There is no testimony of defendant as to 
what considerations prompted his confes-
sion! As earlier stated, while coercive 
threats and promises were made to him, he 
also made statements which indicate that 
the improper statements of the officers did 
not induce him to confess. 
We therefore remand this case to the 
trial court for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the voluntariness of defendant's 
confession under a "totality of all the sur-
rounding circumstances." If the confes-
sion 23 /WMW3 to have been wJuotarDy giv-
en, the conviction is affirmed. However, if 
the confession is found to have been invol-
untarily made, a new trial should follow. 
HALL, C J., and STEWART and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring): 
I join in the majority opinion. However, 
in the absence of some statement as to how 
We view the record before us, our remand 
for a determination of the question of vol-
untariness raises the possibility of an 
avoidable additional appeal and remand. 
As the majority notes, the detective's com-
ments were plainly outside the bounds of 
permissible interrogation and were, on 
their face, coercive. Moreover, the tran-
scripts demonstrate that defendant's con-
. fession was made immediately after these 
coercive statements. For the benefit of the 
trial court and the parties, I think we 
should indicate that while the State has 
contended that "it may be possible . . . to 
find . . . that Bell's improper statements 
did not actually induce defendant to con-
fess" (emphasis added), if such a finding 
Were based on nothing more than the evi-
dence presented to us at this point, there 
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would be some doubt as to such a finding's 
sustainability. 
William ANDREWS, Petitioner, 
v. 
Eldon BARNES, as Warden of the 
Utah State Prison, Respondent 
No. 890359. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 18, 1989. 
Certiorari Denied Oct 30, 1989. 
See 110 S.Ct 354. 
Prisoner brought habeas corpus peti-
tion. The Supreme Court held that (1) 
state's exercise of peremptory challenge to 
excuse prospective black juror was not 
based on juror's race, and (2) any error in 
testimony of witness during penalty phase 
of trial was harmless. 
Petition denied. 
Durham and Zimmerman, JJ., dissent-
ed in part 
1. Habeas Corpus «=>898(3) 
Good cause existed for addressing is-
sue of whether state exercised peremptory 
challenge against juror on the basis of the 
juror's race, even though there had been 
previous petitions for writs of habeas cor-
pus, where issue did not arise until testimo-
ny given by judge before Board of Par-
dons. 
2. Jury «=»120 
State's exercise of peremptory Chal-
lenge against black juror ^ as not based on 
juror's race; prospective juror was law en-
forcement officer who stated that he be-
lieved that persons charged with crimes he 
investigated were guilty, that he believed 
his fellow officers believed the same, and 
some of his fellow officers were scheduled 
to appear as witnesses. 
3. Criminal Law «=»1177 
Any error in testimony of witness at 
penalty phase of trial, that three persons 
who had been convicted of first-degree 
murder and subsequently released from 
state prison had again committed murder 
was insufficient to have played any role in 
jury's determination of penalty, and was 
harmless. 
Timothy K. Ford, Seattle, Wash., Gordon 
G. Greiner, Mary V. Stolcis, Sandra Gold-
man, Patricia A. Rooney, Denver, Colo., 
Robert M. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for 
petitioner. 
Robert R. Wallace^TJ. Tsakalos, Daniel 
S. McConkie, Salt Lake City, for respon-
dent 
PER CURIAM: 
[1] This case is here as a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. As a result of the 
testimony given by Judge Robert Newey, 
who had been the prosecutor in the trial of 
William Andrews, the question has been 
raised in this petition whether the State 
exercised one of its peremptory challenges 
against a juror in the trial of this matter on 
the basis of the juror's race. Since the 
issue did not arise until the testimony given 
by Judge Newey before the Board of Par-
dons, there is good cause under rule 
65B(iX4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which warrants addressing the issue on its 
merits even though there have been previ-
ous petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
filed in this Court Hurst v. Cooky 777 
P.2d 1029 (1989). 
[2] Although a superficial reading of 
Judge Newey*s testimony before the Board 
of Pardons might lead one to conclude that 
the exercise of the peremptory challenge 
was based on race, the trial transcript of 
the actual voir dire examination casts the 
matter in a different light The putative 
juror, a law enforcement officer who exhib-
ited commendable forthrightness, stated 
that he believed that those persons who 
had been charged with crimes as a result of 
his investigations were in fact guilty. He 
also stated that he believed that his fellow 
ANDREWS v. HAUN 
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officers on the Ogden police force believed 
the same. It is clear from the transcript of 
the voir dire questioning, that some of 
those officers were scheduled to appear as 
witnesses in the trial of this matter. Coun-
sel for co-defendant Dale Selby Pierre 
moved to remove the juror, James H. Gil-
lespie, Jr., for cause. That motion was 
expressly joined by counsel for William An-
drews. The trial judge denied the motion. 
Mr. Newey then indicated a willingness to 
agree to the striking of Mr. Gillespie so 
that no peremptory challenges would have 
to be used by defendants to remove him. 
The trial court indicated a willingness to do 
so if all the parties would stipulate to the 
removal of Mr. Gillespie. Counsel for 
Keith Roberts, another co-defendant, how-
ever, refused. As a result Mr. Gillespie 
was passed for cause. 
Based on this portion of the transcript, it 
appears that the State's reason for being 
willing to stipulate to the removal of Mr. 
Gillespie and later for the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge to strike him from 
the venire was to protect against possible 
error and a subsequent appeal that might 
be based on that issue. In all events, the 
record is undisputed that counsel for Wil-
liam Andrews clearly agreed to the remov-
al of Mr. Gillespie after the motion to 
strike for cause was denied. Having twice 
sought to remove Mr. Gillespie from the 
jury panel, William Andrews cannot now 
claim that he was somehow prejudiced by 
the State's removal of Mr. Gillespie. For 
these reasons, we do not believe that peti-
tioner's constitutional rights were in any 
way prejudiced. 
[3] Petitioner also asserts that error 
was committed in the penalty phase of the 
trial by virtue of the fact that a witness 
testified that three persons who had been 
convicted of first degree murder and subse-
quently released from the state prison had 
again committed murder. Petitioner as-
serts that the testimony was inaccurate in 
that only one of those persons can be 
shown to have committed murder. Even if 
petitioner's allegation is accurate, we do 
not believe that the error was sufficient to 
have played any role whatsoever in the 
jury's determination of the appropriate pen-
alty under the circumstances. 
Justices DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN 
dissent with respect to the Court's ruling 
on the striking of juror James H. Gillespie 
from the jury panel. They would issue a 
stay of execution of sentence and refer the 
peremptory challenge issue to the district 
court for an evidentiary hearing before ad-
dressing the merits of the petition. They 
view the prosecutor's statement before the 
Board of Pardons as raising a factual issue 
about the basis for the decision of the 
peremptory challenge. 
The petition for habeas corpus is denied. 
IBf ft SYSTIM > 
William ANDREWS, Petitioner, 
v. 
Pete HAUN, as Chairman of the Utah 
Board of Pardons; Victoria Palacios 
and Ed Kimball, as members of the 
Utah Board of Pardons; the Utah 
Board of Pardons; and Eldon Barnes, 
as Warden of the Utah State Prison, 
Respondents. 
No. 890360. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 18, 1989. 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Timothy K. Ford, Seattle, Wash., Gordon 
G. Greiner, Mary V. Stolcis, Sandra Gold-
man, Patricia A. Rooney, Denver, Colo., 
Robert M. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for 
' petitioner. 
Robert R. Wallace, TJ. Tsakalos, Daniel 
S. McConkie, Salt Lake City, for respon-
dents. 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is here as a petition for ex-
traordinary relief. It appears from the in-
complete submission of the parties, both 
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scope of our capacity to order her removal 
pursuant to either of those provisions. 
The motion for summary disposition is 
granted, and the petition to remove is dis-
missed. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
£ MY NUH_B»S1fSTtM/ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jose Francisco ARROYO, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
No. 890128. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 28, 1990. 
Defendant in a drug prosecution 
moved to suppress cocaine seized from his 
automobile. The Court of Appeals, 770 
P.2d 153, reversed the grant of defendant's 
motion to suppress, and remanded. Certio-
rari was granted. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that: (1) the prosecutor's 
assertion that the search was consensual 
was not evidence and could not support a 
finding of consent, and (2) the officer's stop 
of defendant for following too closely was 
a pretext to search for drugs. 
Court of Appeals' decision reversed 
and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., concurred in the result. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>1158(1) 
Standard of review for trial court's 
finding of fact is that finding should not be 
set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
2. Criminal Law <s=1158(l) 
Finding of fact made by trial -court 
must be rejected if it is not supported by 
substantial, competent evidence.- Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
3. Criminal Law <s=>1181.5(7) 
Searches and Seizures <s=>197 
Prosecutor's affirmative response to 
judge's question of whether search was 
consensual was not evidence, and could not 
support finding of consent; thus, case was 
required to be remanded for evidentiary 
hearing on issue of consent. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures ®=192 
Burden of establishing existence of ex-
ception to search warrant requirement is 
on prosecution. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Searches and Seizures <3=»180 
To establish consent exception to 
search warrant requirement, State must 
demonstrate that consent was voluntary. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Searches and Seizures o=a194 
When prosecution" attempts to prove 
voluntary consent after illegal police action 
(e.g., unlawful arrest or stop), prosecution 
has much heavier burden to satisfy than 
when proving consent to search which does 
not follow police misconduct. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Automobiles <s=349.5(3) 
State trooper's stop of defendant's 
automobile for following too closely was 
pretext to search for drugs; under totality 
of circumstances, reasonable officer would 
not have stopped defendant and cited him 
for following too closely except for some 
unarticulated suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
4. 
8. Searches and Seizures «=>182 
In determining whether consent to 
search is lawfully obtained following initial 
police misconduct, inquiry should focus on 
whether consent was voluntary and wheth-
er consent was obtained by police exploita-
tion of prior illegality. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
STATE v. 
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9. Criminal Law <3=>394.4(1) 
Exclusionary rule protects not only 
those accused of crime but also those 
whose only "crime" may be fitting "pro-
file" which police use to determine whom 
to search. 
10. Searches and Seizures <s=»186 
Search supported by voluntary consent 
which is not exploitation of primary police 
illegality may still be found invalid if 
search exceeds scope of consent.. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
Walter F. Bugden, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and petitioner. 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
STEWART, Justice: 
This case is here on a writ of certiorari to 
review a decision of the court of appeals. 
The case presents important issues con-
cerning the effect of consent searches and 
pretextual traffic stops under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. 
I. FACTS 
On September 15, 1987, at about 4 p.m., 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Man-
gelson was driving southbound on Inter-
state 15 near Nephi, Utah. Mangelson had 
completed his shift an hour earlier and was 
driving home when he observed a north-
bound pickup-camper on the opposite side 
of the freeway. Mangelson made a U-turn 
through the freeway's median strip and 
quickly caught up with the pickup which 
was the last vehicle in a group of two or 
three cars. Mangelson followed the pickup 
and then pulled beside it to observe its 
occupants and gauge its speed. The pick-
up's two occupants were both Hispanic, 
and the truck had out-of-state license 
plates. Mangelson stopped the pickup and 
cited Arroyo, the driver, for following too 
close and driving with an expired license. 
1. The defendant admits in his brief the facts 
stated in the text, but does not admit that the 
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Mangelson asked Arroyo's consent to 
search the truck, and Arroyo agreed.1 The 
search uncovered approximately one kilo-
gram of cocaine inside the passenger-side 
door panel of the pickup. Arroyo was ar-
rested and charged with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distrib-
ute, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (1986). 
Arroyo moved to suppress the evidence 
on the ground that the traffic stop was a 
pretext for searching the truck for evi-
dence of a more serious crime. ' The trial 
court found that the testimony at the sup-
pression hearing "established the probabili-
ty that no [traffic] violation occurred, and 
that the alleged violation was only a pre-
text asserted by the trooper to justify his 
stop of a vehicle with out-of-state license 
plates and with occupants of Latin origin." 
The trial court also ruled that the "[defen-
dant consented to the search of the ve-
hicle." Nevertheless, the court granted 
Arroyo's motion and ordered suppression 
of the evidence. The State filed an inter-
locutory appeal in the court of appeals chal-
lenging the suppression order. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECI-
SION AND THE SUPPRESSION 
HEARING 
The court of appeals held that the traffic 
stop was "an unconstitutional pretext." 
State v, Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). The court stated, "We are 
persuaded that a reasonable officer would 
not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for 
'following too closely' except for some un-
articulated suspicion of more serious crimi-
nal activity." 770 P.2d at 155. 
In addressing the issue of consent raised 
by the prosecution, the court of appeals 
found that defense counsel had blocked the 
prosecution's efforts to establish that Ar-
royo had consented to the search and had 
"[misled] the State and the [trial] court by 
stipulating that consent was given," there-
by preventing the prosecution from explor-
ing the voluntariness of the consent. The 
"consent" given by the defendant was "volun-
tary" under the appropriate legal standard. 
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court of appeals concluded that Arroyo had 
consented to the search and that the "con-
sent" was "voluntary" and reversed the 
trial court's suppression order. 770 P.2d at 
156. 
Two paragraphs of the court of appeals' 
opinion are the crux of its resolution of this 
case: 
In this regard, we note Arroyo did not 
contest the State's argument at the sup-
pression hearing that he voluntarily con-
sented to the search of his truck. Ar-
royo, through his counsel[,] stipulated 
that he consented to the search. Ar-
royo's counsel objected when the State 
attempted to offer evidence to establish 
Arroyo's consent was voluntary, claiming 
it was not relevant as the only issue was 
whether the original stop was a pretext. 
As a result, the trial court limited testi-
mony concerning the circumstances sur-
rounding Arroyo's consent. The trial 
judge specifically found that Arroyo con-
sented to the search of his truck, and 
there is nothing in the record to contra-
dict this finding. 
For the first time on appeal, counsel 
now argues that Arroyo's consent was 
not voluntary as there was no "break in 
the causal connection between the illegal-
ity and the evidence thereby obtained." 
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 
1458 (10th Cir.1985). However, this ar-
. gument should have been made below. 
A defendant cannot mislead the State 
and the court by stipulating that consent 
was given, thus preventing the State 
from exploring the circumstances of the 
consent, and then argue for the first time 
on appeal that the consent given was not 
voluntary. Based on these circum-
stances, we conclude that defendant's 
stipulation included that the consent was 
given voluntarily. 
770 P.2d at 156. 
The court of appeals misconstrued the 
record. The only time consent was men-
tioned at the suppression hearing occurred 
during the testimony of Trooper Mangel-
son: 
Q, [by the prosecutor, Mr. Eyre]: Upon 
the vehicle stopping, what did you im-
mediately do then? 
A. I approached the vehicle. I asked 
for a driver's license. I made as many 
observations about the vehicle as I 
could. 
Q. Describe what you observed. 
A. I observed— 
MR. BUGDEN [defense counsel]: 
Your Honor, for the record I think I 
would object to any further inquiry at 
this point. My motion only goes to the 
propriety and the lawfulness of the 
stop. And I think if that is what— 
THE COURT: Was this a consent 
search? * 
MR. EYRE: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: I think that is true, 
Counsel. It goes strictly to the stop. 
MR. EYRE: Okay. 
Q. Anything ejse about the stop that 
you recall that you have not previously 
testified to? 
A. I don't believe so. 
The court of appeals'"opinion states, "Ar-
royo's counsel objected when the State at-
tempted to offer evidence to establish Ar-
royo's consent was voluntary " .770 
P.2d at 156. The transcript of the suppres-
sion hearing reveals that prior to the objec-
tion by Arroyo's counsel, no mention had 
been made of consent and that the objec-
tion was made to a question concerning 
what observations Trooper Mangelson 
made as he approached Arroyo's vehicle. 
Defense counsel did not utter a word about 
voluntary consent during the course of the 
proceedings. Furthermore, as the court of 
appeals' opinion correctly states, it was the 
trial judge, not defense counsel, who "limit-
ed testimony concerning the circumstances 
surrounding" the issue of consent. 770 
P.2d at 156. 
[1,2] The court of appeals stated that 
the trial court found that "Arroyo consent-
ed to the search of the truck, and there is 
nothing in the record to contradict this 
finding." 770 P.2d at 156. Finding No. 18 
in the trial court's findings and conclusions 
does state, "The Trooper requested permis-
sion to search the Defendant's vehicle, and 
STATE v. 
Cite as 796 P.2d 
the Defendant consented to the search of 
the vehicle." However, the court of ap-
peals applied the wrong standard of review 
in evaluating this finding. The standard of 
review for a trial court's finding of fact is 
that a finding shall not be set aside unless 
it is clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P. 
52(a); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 2573, at 
689 (1971); see also State v. Maurer, 770 
P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1989). A finding not 
supported by substantial, competent evi-
dence must be rejected. 50 W. Broadway 
Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 
1162, 1171 (Utah 1989). 
[3] The only "evidence" anywhere in 
this record which supports the finding of 
consent is the prosecutor's response to the 
judge's question about consent.2 However, 
a prosecutor's assertion that consent was 
given is not evidence and cannot support a 
finding of consent. See, e.g., Stading v. 
Equilease Corp., 471 So.2d 1379, 1379 (Fla. 
Dist.CtApp.1985); Leon Shaffer Golnick 
Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So.2d 1015, 
1017 (Fla.DistCtApp.1982) ("[Attorneys'] 
unsworn statements do not establish facts 
in the absence of stipulation. Trial judges 
cannot rely upon these unsworn statements 
as the basis for making factual determina-
tions "); see also Caperon v. Tuttle, 
100 Utah 476, 484, 116 P.2d 402, 405-06 
(1941); see generally 88 CJ.S. Trial 
§ 181a, at 355 (1955). It follows that the 
trial court's finding of consent is clearly 
erroneous. The court of appeals' conclu-
sion about consent is also erroneous. 
In short, the record simply does not sup-
port the court of appeals' conclusion about 
the issue of consent The record contains 
no suggestion that defense counsel "[mis-
led] the State and the court" on the issue 
of consent and the record reveals no evi-
dence concerning consent and no stipula-
tion regarding consent Consent should 
have been explored _at the suppression 
hearing, but it was the trial court, not 
defense counsel, who preempted the prose-
2. The court of appeals' opinion asserts that de-
fense counsel stipulated "that consent was giv-
en." 770 P.2d at 156. However, no stipulation 
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cution's efforts to reach the issue. There-
fore, the court of appeals was wrong in 
reversing the trial court's suppression or-
der. Instead, the case should be remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
consent. 
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED IN A CONSENT 
SEARCH FOLLOWING POLICE IL-
LEGALITY 
Since this case must be remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing, it is appropriate to de-
fine the parameters of the consent issue 
which should be explored by the trial -eourt. 
See, e.g., State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d'1368, 
1370 (Utah 1986); Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 
2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974). 
A. Exceptions to Warrant Requirement 
[4,5] Searches conducted "outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment—sub-
ject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct 
507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (citations 
omitted); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983). The burden of establishing 
the existence of one of the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement is on the prosecu-
tion. Harris, 671 P.2d at 178. To estab-
lish the consent exception, the state must 
demonstrate that the consent was volun-
tary. United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 
1141, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 479 
U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct 315, 93 L.Ed.2d 289 
(1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 
1377 (Utah 1986); State v. Whittenback, 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
B. Validity of Consent Following A Po-
lice Illegality 
[6,7] When the prosecution attempts to 
prove voluntary consent after an illegal 
police action (e.g., unlawful arrest or stop), 
the prosecution "has a much heavier bur-
den to satisfy than when proving consent 
on any issue by defense counsel appears any-
where in the record of this case. 
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to search" which does not follow police 
misconduct. United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir.1984) 
(citing United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 
913, 916 (5th Cir.1978)). In this case, a law 
enforcement officer precipitated events 
which led to the search of Arroyo's vehicle. 
The trial court found that Trooper Mangel-
son's stop was not a lawful traffic stop but 
rather a pretext to allow Mangelson to 
investigate the car and its occupants. The 
court of appeals agreed, stating that under 
the totality of the circumstances, "a rea-
sonable officer would not have stopped Ar-
royo and cited him for 'following too close-
ly' except for some unarticulated suspicion 
of more serious criminal activity." 770 
P.2d at 155. The trial court and the court 
of appeals were clearly correct on this is-
sue—Trooper Mangelson's stop was an un-
constitutional pretext.3 
In cases involving the admissibility of 
evidence obtained as a consequence of po-
lice misconduct, the United States Supreme 
Court has eschewed a "but for" test Un-
der such a test, all evidence that would not 
have been discovered but for the initial 
police misconduct would be suppressed. In 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487-88, 83 S.Ct 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
(1963), the Supreme Court expressly de-
clined to hold "that all evidence is 'fruit of 
the poisonous tree' simply because it would 
not have come to light but for the illegal 
actions of the police." See also Dunaway 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217, 99 S.Ct 
3. The following findings of fact justify the con-
clusion that the stop was a pretext: 
8. As a result [of] Trooper Mangelson's 
training at [a] seminar, he admitted that 
whenever he observed an Hispanic individual 
driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the ve-
hicle. The Trooper also admitted that once 
he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the 
time he requested permission%to search the 
vehicle. 
X 
14. Under cross-examination, the Trooper 
denied that it was his normal procedure when 
issuing a citation to an individual for "Follow-
ing too Close" to record the license plate of 
the front car. However, the Trooper's denial 
on this point was contradicted by tape record-
ed testimony from the Trooper at the prelimi-
nary hearing held in this matter. The Troop-
er admitted that he had not recorded the 
2248, 2259, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct* 2254, 
2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Justice Powell 
has stated that the Court's rejection of a 
"but for" test in Wong Sun "recognizes 
that in some circumstances strict adher-
ence to the Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule imposes greater cost on the legit-
imate demands of law enforcement than 
can be justified by the rule's deterrent pur-
poses." Brown, 422 U.S. at 608-09, 95 
S.Ct. at 2264 (Powell, J., concurring in 
part). Therefore, under certain circum-
stances, evidence obtained after police mis-
conduct may be admissible. 
[8] Two factors determine whether con-
sent to a search' is lawfully obtained follow-
ing initial police misconduct The inquiry 
should focus on whether the consent was 
voluntary and whether the consent was 
obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. Evidence obtained in searches 
following police illegality must meet both 
tests to be admissible. 3 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 190 (2d 
ed.1987). 
1. Voluntary consent 
The case law holds that a consent which 
is not voluntarily given is invalid. See, e.g., 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
233, 93 S.Ct 2041, 2050, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 
1141, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 479 
U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 315, 93 L.Ed.2d 289 
(1986); State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 
license plate number of the front car in this 
case. 
15. The Defendant testified that he was at 
least 85 to 95 feet or nine car lengths, behind 
the vehicle immediately in front of his own. 
The Court finds this testimony to be credible. 
16. In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded 
that Trooper Mangelson rightfully determined 
that the Defendant was "Following too Close" 
or that any other attested facts preponderated 
to the level necessary to permit a constitution-
al stop of the Defendant's vehicle. Moreover, 
the Court finds that the Trooper's own testi-
mony established the probability that no vio-
lation of law occurred, and that the alleged 
violation was only a pretext asserted by the 
Trooper to justify his stop of a vehicle with 
out of state license plates and with occupants 
of Latin origin. 
STATE v. 
Cite as 796 P.2d 
1056 (Utah 1987); State v. Whittenback, 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Generally, 
whether the requisite voluntariness exists 
depends on "the totality of all the sur-
rounding circumstances—both the charac-
teristics of the accused and the details of" 
police conduct Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
226, 93 S.Ct at 2047; see also State v. 
Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989). 
2. Exploitation of primary illegality 
A second factor is whether consent was 
obtained through police exploitation of the 
primary or antecedent police illegality. A 
few courts have not accepted the second 
factor. The Tenth Circuit in United States 
v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert 
denied, 479 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct 315, 93 
L.Ed.2d 289 (1986), focused exclusively on 
the voluntariness of the consent in deter-
mining whether the taint of the prior police 
illegality had been purged. The court stat-
ed: 
We hold that voluntary consent, as de-
fined for Fourth Amendment purposes, is 
an intervening act free of police exploita-
tion of the primary illegality and is suffi-
ciently distinguishable from the primary 
illegality to purge^  the evidence of the 
primary taint 
. . . The exploitation issue focuses sole-
ly on defendant's grant of consent, not 
on the bare request, or the reasons un-
derlying it While the police may exert 
coercion in the manner in which they 
request defendant's consent, the request 
itself, even if motivated by the fruits of 
the prior illegality, is not exploitation. 
793 F.2d at 1147-49 (emphasis in original). 
The Utah Court of Appeals followed this 
approach in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). However, we disagree 
with the rule established in Sierra because 
it fails to give proper weight to Fourth 
Amendment values, and we address the 
issue of the propjerjstandard to be applied 
in this jurisdiction under the second prong 
of the analysis. 
Professor LaFave has stated, "The ap-
parent and unfortunate conclusion in Car-
son, therefore, is that exploitation can nev-
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er occur in the sense of the illegal search 
strongly influencing police in thereafter 
seeking a particular consent, but only in 
the sense of bringing added pressure to 
bear upon the person from whom the con-
sent is sought" 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.2(d), at 19-20 n. 88.1 (Supp. 
1990). For example, under Carson, police 
have power to conduct warrantless 
searches without probable cause and then 
use the fruits of illegal searches by obtain-
ing a voluntary consent after the search 
has already occurred. Police should not be 
permitted to ratify their own illegal con-
duct by merely obtaining a consent after 
the illegality has occurred. 
Indeed, Carson seems to be antithetical 
to the purpose of the exclusionary rule. In 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 
80 S.Ct 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), 
the Supreme Court stated, "(The rule's] 
purpose is to deter—to compel respect for 
the constitutional guaranty in the only ef-
fectively available way—by removing the 
incentive to disregard it" A further pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule implicated 
here, as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1875. 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968), is to prevent making a court a 
"party to lawless invasions of the constitu-
tional rights of citizens by permitting un-
hindered governmental use of the fruits of 
such invasions." Neither of these pur-
poses is effectuated by ignoring police mis-
conduct which is what the Carson ap-
proach encourages. 
[9] The exclusionary rule protects not 
only those accused of a crime but also 
those whose only "crime" may be fitting a 
"profile" which police use to determine 
whom to search. In United States v. Mil-
ler, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir.1987), the Elev-
enth Circuit stated: 
The record does not reveal how many 
unsuccessful searches Trooper Vogel has 
conducted or how many innocent travel-
ers the officer has detained. Common 
sense suggests that those numbers may 
be significant As well as protecting al-
leged criminals who are wrongfully 
stopped or searched, the Fourth Amend-
(J90 Utah 796 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ment of the Constitution protects these 
innocent citizens as well. 
821 F.2d at 550. 
The basis for the second part of the 
two-part analysis is found in the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), which stated that 
a trial court must determine in such a case 
" 'whether, granting establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which 
instant objection is made has been come at 
by exploitation of that illegality or instead 
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint' " 371 U.S. at 
488, 83 S.Ct. at 417 (quoting Maguire, Evi-
dence of Guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine has been ex-
tended to invalidate consents which, despite 
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploi-
tation of a prior police illegality. 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct 
1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), is an example 
of the application of the second part of the 
two-part test In Royer, & suspect who 
matched a drug courier profile was de-
tained at an airport by two police officers 
who requested and retained the suspect's 
airline ticket and driver's license. The offi-
cers asked Royer to accompany them to a 
room, later characterized as a "large stor-
age closet," in the airport The officers 
retrieved Royer's luggage from the airline 
and obtained Royer's consent to open and 
search the luggage. The search uncovered 
narcotics. The trial court subsequently 
found that Royer's consent was "freely and 
voluntarily given" and therefore denied a 
suppression motion. The Supreme Court 
held that the detention of Royer constitut-
ed an illegal seizure. 460 U.S. at 507, 103 
S.Ct at 1329. Without questioning the as-
sertion that Royer's consent was "freely 
4. In analyzing whether an exploitation of a pri-
mary illegality has occurred, nfcmy courts use 
the criteria listed by the Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). See, e.g., State v. Cates, 202 
Conn. 615, 621-23, 522 A.2d 788, 792-93 (1987); 
People v. Odom, 83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 1028, 39 
Ill.Dec. 406, 411, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980); 
State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189, 191 (La.1978); 
State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072, 1077 (Me. 
1982); People v. Borges, 69 N.Y.2d 1031, 1033, 
517 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916, 511 N.E.2d 58, 59-60 
and voluntarily given," the plurality opin-
ion concluded that "the consent was tainted 
by the illegality and was ineffective to jus-
tify the search." 460 U.S. at 507-08, 103 
S.Ct. at 1329. Thus, the exploitation of the 
illegality of the detention was the determi-
native factor, despite the voluntariness of 
the consent. 
Similarly, in People v. Odom, 83 111. 
App.3d 1022, 39 Ill.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 
997 (1980), the court held that the defen-
dant was illegally arrested by police who 
lacked sufficient probable cause to effect 
an arrest. The defendant had given offi-
cers consent to search a jacket in a vehicle. 
The officers found drug paraphernalia. 
The trial court held that "the items found 
pursuant to ttfe search of [the] jacket were 
not the fruit of [the] illegal arrest but 
were, rather, obtained as a result of . . . 
voluntary consent," which the trial court 
stated was an "independent intervening" 
factor. 83 IllvApp.3d at 1025, 39 Ill.Dec. at 
409, 404 N.E.2d at 1000. The appellate 
court agreed that the consent was volun-
tary but stated: 
However, a finding that the defen-
dant's consent to search was voluntarily 
given is but one step-in the determination 
of the propriety of the search,. because 
even if the consent were voluntary it still 
may have been obtained by the exploita-
tion of an illegal arrest Therefore, 
the question before us is whether 
Odom's consent was obtained by the ex-
ploitation of an illegal arrest, or "by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint" 
83 Ill.App.3d at 1027-28, 39 Ill.Dec. at 411, 
404 N.E.2d at 1002 (quoting Brown v. Illi-
nois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct 2254, 2259, 
45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)).4 The court held 
(1987); Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414, 431 
(Tex.Crim.App. 1987). Brown, concerned the 
question of when a confession is the fruit of a 
prior illegal arrest. The Court rejected a per se 
rule that the giving of Miranda warnings is a 
sufficient break in the chain of events between 
the arrest and the confession. 422 U.S. at 603, 
95 S.Ct. at 2261. In so doing, the Court stated 
reasons which are also applicable to a consent 
to search which is preceded by a police illegali-
ty: 
STATE v. 
Cite as 796 P.2d 
that the consent had been tainted because 
police illegally arrested the defendant at 
gunpoint, even though there was no indica-
tion, he was armed and less than a minute 
separated the arrest and the consent On 
this basis, the court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction. 
Numerous other courts have adopted the 
same basic analysis. See, e.g., United 
States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Melendez-Gonza-
lez, 1ZI F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir.1984) ("In 
addition to proving valid and voluntary con-
sent to search, the Government must also 
establish the existence of intervening 
factors which prove that the consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal 
stop."); United States v. Thompson, 712 
F.2d 1356, 1361 (11th Cir.1983) ("Because 
[defendant] was illegally detained when he 
gave his consent . . . the district court's 
conclusion that [the] consent was voluntary 
is insufficient to validate the seizure and 
search. [Defendant's] consent must also 
be untainted by the illegal detention."); 
United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 
(9th Cir.1981) ("[Evidence found as a re-
sult of . . . consent must nonetheless be 
suppressed if the unconstitutional conduct 
was not sufficiently attenuated from the 
subsequent seizure "); United States v. 
Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 243-44 (6th Cir.), cert 
denied, 419 U.S. 1048, 95 S.Ct 622, 42 
Thus, even if the statements in this case 
were found to be voluntary under the Fifth 
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue re-
mains. In order for the causal chain, be-
tween the illegal arrest and the statements 
made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong 
Sun requires not merely that the statement 
meet the Fifth Amendment standard of volun-
tariness but that it be "sufficiently an act of 
free will to purge the primary taint." Wong 
Sun thus mandates consideration of a state-
ment's admissibility in light of the distinct 
policies and interests of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were 
held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitu-
tional arrest, regardless of how wanton and 
purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, 
the effect of the-exclusionary rule would be 
substantially diluted. Arrests made without 
warrant or without probable cause, for ques-
tioning or "investigation," would be encour-
aged by the knowledge that evidence derived 
therefrom could well be made admissible at 
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L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) (''[Information gained 
by law enforcement officers during an il-
legal search cannot be used in a derivative 
manner to obtain other evidence "); 
State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 621, 522 
A.2d 788, 791 (1987) C[T]he mere fact a 
consent to a search or a seizure is volun-
tary does not necessarily remove the taint 
[of a prior illegality]." (Emphasis in origi-
nal.)); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 297 
(La.1985) ("When made after an illegal de-
tention or search, consent to search, even if 
voluntary, is valid only if it was the prod-
uct of a free will and not the result of an 
exploitation of the previous illegality."); 
State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072, 1077 
(Me.1982) ("[T)he obvious connection be-
tween the invalid stop and the seizure of 
[the evidence] has not been dissipated by 
the defendant's consent to search "); 
People v. Borges, 69 N.Y.2d 1031,1033, 517 
N.Y.S.2d 914, 916, 511 N.E.2d 58, 59 (1987) 
("Although the voluntariness of the con-
sent is an important factor in the court's 
determination of attenuation, it is not dis-
positive...."); Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 
414, 431 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("The better 
test is, of course, that evidence obtained by 
the purported consent should not be held 
admissible unless it is determined that the 
consent was both voluntary and not an 
exploitation of the prior illegality."). 
trial by the simple expedient of giving Mi-
randa warnings. Any incentive to avoid 
Fourth Amendment violations would be evis-
cerated by making the warnings in effect, a 
"cure-all,'' and the constitutional guarantee 
against unlawful searches and seizures could 
be said to be reduced to "a form of words." 
422 VS. at 601-03, 95 S.Ct. at 2260-61 (citations 
omitted). The Court concluded that Miranda 
warnings were only one factor to be considered. 
422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. The Court 
listed "temporal proximity of the arrest and the 
confession, the presence of intervening circum-
stances [and] the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct" as relevant factors in such 
cases. 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62. 
Professor LaFave has stated that similar factors 
are applicable to consent to search cases. 3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 
(2d ed.1987). These factors should be con-
sidered in determining if there has been an 
exploitation of the primary illegality in such 
cases. 
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In sum, we hold that the court of ap-
peals' adoption of the Carson test in Sier-
ra was erroneous. 
IV. SCOPE OF CONSENT 
[10] Finally, a search supported by vol-
untary consent which is not an exploitation 
of the primary illegality may still be found 
invalid if the search exceeds the scope of 
the consent. Professor LaFave stated: 
When the police are relying upon consent 
as a basis for their warrantless search, 
they have no more authority than they 
have been given by the consent. 
Assuming . . . that a general and un-
qualified consent was given, then the 
boundaries of the place referred to mark 
the outer physical limits of the autho-
rized search. Even within those limits, 
however, the police do not have carte 
blanche to do whatever they please. 
Certainly they may not engage in search 
activity which involves the destruction of 
property, and this would seem to bar 
breaking into locked containers. 
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), 
at 160-61 (2d ed.1987); see, e.g., State v. 
Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 867 (Me.1974) 
("[A] general consent to search . . . would 
not . . . sanction . . . the tearing down of 
walls...."). 
Here, there is nothing in the record that 
suggests what the limits of Trooper Man-
gelson's search were. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the decision of the court of ap-
peals is reversed, and the case is remanded 
to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine the voluntariness of the con-
sent, whether the consent was an exploita-
tion of the illegal stop, and the scope of the 
consent. 
Reversed and remanded. ^ 
HOWE, Associate CJ., and DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result. 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR-
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State highway contractor sought to en-
force supplemental agreement purportedly 
intended to compensate it for underrun of 
riprap. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Richard H. Moffat, J., entered 
judgment enforcing agreement, and state 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that: (1) supplemental agreement was 
valid and binding contract, but (2) material 
fact issues existed as to state's claim for 
reformation or rescission based on unilater-
al mistake. 
Reversed in part and remanded for 
further proceedings. 
1. Judgment <s=*181(2, 3] 
Summary judgment is granted when 
no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law; where there is material 
issue of fact, summary judgment is inap-
propriate. 
2. Highways <$=>113(3) 
Supplemental agreement intended to 
compensate state highway contractor for 
underrun of riprap in excess of 25% was 
B & A ASSOC, v. L.A. 
Cite a* 796 P2d 
valid and binding contract even though it 
was never physically delivered to contrac-
tor; agreement bore all necessary signa-
tures of state officials and clearly stated 
that "signing this agreement settles any 
and all claims on contract item [riprap]." 
3. Judgment <3=>181(19) 
Material fact issues existed as to 
whether state highway department's chief 
construction officer realized at time he 
signed supplemental agreement intended to 
compensate contractor for underrun of rip-
rap that contract item pertaining to riprap 
was related to unbalanced item for "clear-
ing and grubbing," and thus whether sign-
ing amounted to unilateral mistake which 
could serve as basis for reformation or 
rescission, precluding summary judgment 
for contractor on claim under agreement 
R. Paul Van Dam, Donald S. Coleman, 
and Leland D. Ford, Salt Lake City, for 
Utah Dept of Transp. 
Robert F. Babcock and Michael C. Van, 
Salt Lake City, for B & A Associates. 
Paul R. Howell, Clark B. Fetzer, and 
Mark R. Madsen, Salt Lake City, and David 
Hughes, Mission Viejo, Cal., for L.A. 
Young Sons Const Co. and Reliance Ins. 
Co. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This case involves only Reliance Insur-
ance Company (Reliance) as appellee and 
Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) as appellant and is on appeal from 
a grant of a partial summary judgment in 
favor of Reliance in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County. The trial 
court held that no genuine issues of materi-
al fact existed with respect to a supplemen-
tal agreement between Reliance's assignor, 
L.A. Young Sons Construction Company 
(Young), and UDOT compensating Young 
for fixed costs and overhead incurred by a 
63.9 percent underrun on a UDOT project 
FACTS 
On April 23, 1985, UDOT began accept-
ing bids on a project to reconstruct a por-
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tion of Interstate 80 near Black Rock in 
Tooele County, Utah (the project). On May 
13, 1985, Young was awarded the bid and 
contracted with UDOT to perform all con-
struction work on the project for the ap-
proximate sum of $9,940,893.25. 
Reliance furnished both payment and 
performance bonds for Young on the 
project. In addition, Young entered into 
continuing agreements of indemnity with 
Reliance pursuant to which Reliance is as-
signed any claims or causes of action 
Young may have in connection with the 
project. 
Included in Young's bid was a cest esti-
mate for the placement of 226,200* tons of 
"riprap." Young initially subcontracted 
the riprap work to B & A, which bid $5 per 
ton to Young. Young in turn bid only $4 
per ton on its master bid schedule. The bid 
was based on a quantity estimate supplied 
by UDOT engineers and relied upon by all 
contractors who submitted bids. 
Also included in Young's bid was a cost 
estimate for "clearing and grubbing" that 
was well in excess of UDOT's estimate. 
While UDOT estimated $5,000 for clearing 
and grubbing and the average bid sub-
mitted by contractors was $38,052, Young's 
bid was $832,420. This inflated bid was 
attributed to "unbalanced bidding," a prac-
tice whereby contractors attempt to mask 
or hide their cost structure from competi-
tors by overbidding some aspects of the 
project and underbidding others. Unbal-
anced bidding is also utilized to attempt to 
meet increased funding needs at particular 
intervals in the project 
Young was awarded the bid under condi-
tion that Young accept payment for the 
clearing and grubbing in stages. After. 
Young accepted this condition, UDOT 
sought approval to award the unbalanced 
contract from the Federal Highway Admin-
istration (FHWA), which administered the 
federal highway funds used in the project. 
FHWA raised some concerns about the 
quantity of riprap specified by the UDOT 
engineers, but after receiving verification 
from UDOT's district director, FHWA con-
curred in the bid award to Young as pro-
posed by UDOT. 
